West Asian flare-up: A nuclear Iran seems dangerously close

The last few weeks have transformed Iran’s security situation, no less than Israel’s. Until then, Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spent decades nurturing to threaten Israel, had looked formidable. 

But after one of the most effective decapitation operations in military history, Iran can no longer rely on Hezbollah for its “forward defence.” Hezbollah’s troops are in a fight for their own survival. 

The need to re-establish this lost deterrence led directly to Iran’s massed ballistic missile strike at Israeli targets. This was, as I wrote at the time, a strategic mistake.

Unlike a previous such demonstration in April, Iran’s missile command was really trying this time. They gave no lengthy notice. They used only the most potent weapons in the Iranian arsenal, ballistic missiles, and these were bunched so as to saturate and penetrate Israel’s air defences. A significant number made it through, yet their impact appears to have been minimal.

This has created the worst of all worlds. What the strike in fact demonstrated was Israel’s ability to absorb Iran’s best shot. The targets were largely military bases, including airfields, and initial reports suggest the damage sustained was limited. 

Israel has long prepared for this, and not just by developing air defences. Civilians have bunkers to go to. Aircraft aren’t kept in the open, but under hardened shelters.

The more disturbing message was that had those missiles been tipped with nuclear warheads, rather than conventional ones, the destruction would have been existential. 

So, between the outcome of two massive conventional missile strikes and Hezbollah’s incapacitation, it’s now clear to both sides that Iran has no effective deterrent against an Israeli attack—unless and until Iran develops a nuclear arsenal.

As a commentary in the IRGC-affiliated Javan (or Youth) publication lamented, Iran can work with its partners in the so-called Axis of Resistance to try restoring some measure of deterrence, but against the technological superiority Israel has shown it’s unlikely to be enough. 

The obvious solution was “a change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine,” from civilian to military, the author wrote, adding that Iran now has the capacity to do that quickly.

To be very clear, the original sin here lies with Iran. Its leaders probably did not design—or perhaps even know about—the 7 October Hamas attack that led to this crisis. Yet, Iran’s leadership celebrated the butchery and saw Israel’s response as an opportunity to weaken the Jewish state. 

It activated, really for the first time, a coordinated attack on Israel by the Axis militias that surround it. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could have told Hezbollah to stop shelling Israel; he could have told Houthis in Yemen to stop firing on global shipping lanes. He chose not to.

No doubt Khamenei thought he was winning, just as Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thinks he’s winning now. Who, after all, truly knew that Israel’s intelligence services had so thoroughly penetrated Hezbollah that they’d be able to blow up its pagers and target and kill its leaders at secret meetings? 

Certainly not Khamenei. What hasn’t changed in recent weeks is that Iran spent the last decade hardening its nuclear programme against attack, with the most valuable equipment literally buried under mountains. 

Eliminating the programme is likely impossible, while to try and fail is almost guaranteed to trigger an Iranian dash for the bomb. Any serious attempt, moreover, would require a massive attack of the kind that can only be carried out with US participation.

A further constraining factor is that ordinary Iranians are potentially Israel’s best allies in its goal of unseating Khamenei’s regime, because they despise it. Netanyahu knows this. 

In a recent broadcast, he appealed to the Iranian people directly. Any attack that causes collateral damage to civilians would risk provoking a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Israel will likely focus on non-nuclear targets; this time, perhaps Iran’s air defences and missile launchers, or its energy structure. Whether that will achieve much more than a further round of escalatory strikes is unclear. Yet the die seems cast. Israel will retaliate to Iran’s missile attack, and Tehran will likely follow through on its threats to respond.

An Iranian nuclear breakout, and an Israeli strike to prevent it, have drawn closer. ©bloomberg